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TRIAL PRACTICE-MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-WHAT
MAY A SUCCEEDING JUDGE CONSJl)ER IN RULING ON
MOTION MADE BEFORE HIS PREDECESSOR

In an action against the manufacturer for damages caused by
a defect in an automobile, the jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff in the amount of $50,000, whereupon the trial judge
stated, "Members of the jury, I am astounded. It is my opinion
that that is clearly against the weight of the evidence in this
case." A motion for a new trial was made by the defendant, but
the trial judge died before it could be heard by him. Subsequently,
the motion was assigned to another judge of the district court
who denied the motion on the ground that he was not free to i·eweigh the evidence and on condition that the plaintiff remit so
much of the verdict as was in excess of $31,060. Held: Remanded to the district court with instructions to reconsider the
motion for a new trial by weighing the evidence and all other
relevant factors. The court stated that one relevant factor was
the expressed views of the trial judge at the time the verdict was
rendered.1
1

Magee v. General Motors, 213 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1954).
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Despite the provision made in Rule 63 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure,2 which grants power to a succeeding judge to
i·ule on motions left undecided by his predecessor, there remains
the question of what can be considered by the successor in his
determination of the motions.
Under the common law practice, leaving a motion for a new
trial undecided was a proper grounds for a new trial where the
trial judge was incapacitated, or for other reasons did not complete the trial. The reasoning behind such a practice was that
there was no record of the trial proceedings on which the successor
could base a decision.3 With the enactment of statutes providing
for stenographic reports of the trial proceedings and as improvements in the methods of taking the record of trials were developed,
it became the practice to allow the succeeding judge power to
decide motions left undecided by the previous judge.4
The most serious objection raised in allowing the successor

to rule on motions for new trials has been that he was not physically present at the trial, and therefore could not give proper
weight to the appearance of 'vitnesses and their manner of testifying-both of which would have an effect on the weight given
to their testimony. 5 This argument has been especially urged
when the grounds for the new trial were that the verdict of the
jury was against the weight of evidence. 6 However, even in this
situation it is held that the successor can make a fair and just
ruling as to the desirability for a new trial by an examination of
the record of evidence.7

Fed. R. Civ. P. 63.
Penn l\1ut. Life Ins. Co.v. Ashe, 145 Fed. 593 (6th Cir. 1906); Bass
, .. Swingley, 42 Kan. 729, 22 Pac. 714 (1889).
4 Brent v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., 202 Fed. 335 (W.D. Wash. 1913); Meldrum v. United States, 151 Fed. 177 (9th Cir. 1907); Commonwealth v.
Gedzium, 261 Mass. 299, 159 N.E. 51 (1927); Great Northern Ry. v.
Becher-Barrett-Lockerby Co., 200 Minn. 258, 274 N.W. 522 (1937); Southhall v. Evans, 114 Va. 461, 76 S.E. 929 (1913).
o People ex rel Hambel v. McConnell, 155 Ill. 192, 40 N.E. 608 (1895).
tJ Bass v. Swingley, 42 Kan. 729, 22 Pac. 714 (1889); Heiland v. Hildebrand, 81 Ohio .App. 25, 70 N.E.2d 678 (1946); Lance v. Slusher, 74 Ohio
.App. 361, 59 N.E.2d 57 (1944); Bernard v. McRay, 89 Okla. 1, 213 Pac.
82 (1923); Carkonen v. Columbia & P.S. Ry., 102 Wash. 11, 172 Pac.
816 (1918).
7 Heiland v. Hildebrand, 81 Ohio .App. 25, 70 N.E.2d 678 (1946);
Lance v. Slusher, 74 Ohio App. 361, 59 N.E.2d 57 (1944); Bernard v.
l\1cRay, 89 Okla. 1, 213 Pac. 82 (1923); Carkonen v. Columbia & P.S.
Ry., 102 Wash. 11, 172 Pac. 816 (1918).
2
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Statutes giving the succeeding judge power to decide motions
made in the trial before his predecessor have been silent on what
the succeeding judge should consider in making his decision. Dicta
in the cases usually indicates that the succeeding judge should
consider the evidence of the trial as found in the transcript of
the proceedings.8 There has been little occasion for a court to
decide whether the former trial judge's statements of opinion may
be taken into consideration.9
When a court requires the succeeding judge to consider statements of opinion, it is departing from the very basis on which the
successor's power was allowed, i.e., that the evidence on which
the jury verdict was based can be found in the record of trial,
thus enabling the succeeding judge to make a fair ruling as to a
motion for a new trial. Such a practice can lead to unjust results and cause hardship to the participants in the litigation. For
example, suppose that upon the rendition of the verdict by the
jury, the trial judge exclaims, without thought on his part, that
in his opinion the verdict is against the weight of evidence. It
may be that the evidence actually supports the verdict, and upon
further contemplation the trial judge would have realized that
his prior statement was erroneous. He dies before he can rule
on the motion for a new trial. The successor, relying on this
opinion rather than the evidence in the record, might grant a new
trial. This would cause the appellee to relitigate his claim for no
valid reason.
Conversely, the trial judge, in the previous example, might
exclaim that the jury's decision was correct when in fact the record shows this conclusion to be erroneous. The successor, giving
undue weight to that statement of opinion, refuses the motion for
new trial. As a result such a conclusion deprives a deserving
person a new trial.
Further, in the instant case it is within the realm of possibility that the previous judge's remark, "It is my opinion that
that is clearly against the weight of evidence," was concerned
s Lance v. Slusher, 74 Ohio App. 361, 59 N.E.2d 57 (1944); Great
Northern Ry. v. Becher-Barrett-Lockerby Co., 200 l\Iinn. 258, 27 4 N.W.
522 (1937); Bernard v. l\icRay, 89 Okla. l, 213 Pac. 82 (1923); People v.
McConnell, 155 Ill. 192, 40 N.E. 608 (1895).
9 Carkonen v. Columbia & P.S. Ry., 102 Wash. 11, 172 Pac. 816 ( 1918)
("This, we think, shows that the judge while taking into consideration
what he conceived to be the views of his predecessor in office, determined
the matter from the entire record, and exercised his own judgment and
discretion in so doing.").
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only with the question of excessive damages as shown by the
evidence, not with the jury's finding of defendant's liability. It
would be mere guesswork to say to what part of the jury's verdict he intended to refer. In the case in question, the damages
were actually reduced by the successor. This strengthens the
proposition that the basis of the predecessor's opinion was that
the damages were excessive as shown by the evidence.
In Nebraska10 another problem is presented as to what a
successor may consider in ruling on a motion for a new trial. A
ruling on a motion for a new trial is appealable to the supreme
court. Contrary to federal practice, the Nebraska Supreme Court
decides the motion on its merits without remanding it to the trial
court for reconsideration. As in federal practice, the supreme
court should restrict itself to a consideration of the evidence in
the record and ignore the trial court's statement of opinion.
In conclusion, the succeeding judge should restrict his consideration to evidence in the record when ruling on a motion for
a new trial. He should disregard a predecessor's statements of
opinions for the following reasons: (1) The statements are not
evidence received in the trial court; (2) There is a possibility of
misinterpreting the reason for his remarks; (3) There is the uncertainty of whether the judge would have changed his mind
after reflecting on the evidence.
William H. Hein, '55

10 Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 153 Neb. 98, 43 N.W.2d 609
(1950).

